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Abstract—In this paper, we study spectrum allocation mech-
anisms in hierarchical multi-layer markets which are expected
to proliferate in the near future based on the current spectrum
policy reform proposals. We consider a setting where a state
agency sells spectrum channels to Primary Operators (POs) who
subsequently resell them to Secondary Operators (SOs) through
auctions. We show that these hierarchical markets do not result
in a socially efficient spectrum allocation which is aimed by
the agency, due to lack of coordination among the entities in
different layers and the inherently selfish revenue-maximizing
strategy of POs. In order to reconcile these opposing objectives,
we propose an incentive mechanism which aligns the strategy
and the actions of the POs with the objective of the agency,
and thus leads to system performance improvement in terms of
social welfare. This pricing-based scheme constitutes a method
for hierarchical market regulation. A basic component of the
proposed incentive mechanism is a novel auction scheme which
enables POs to allocate their spectrum by balancing their derived
revenue and the welfare of the SOs.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
Nowadays, it is common belief that the current coarse and
static spectrum management policy creates a spectrum short-
age. While this resource is expensive and scarce, significant
amount of the reserved spectrum remains idle and unexploited
by legitimate owners. A prominent proposed solution is the
reform of the spectrum allocation policy and the deployment
of dynamic spectrum (DS) markets, [1]. Spectrum should be
allocated in a finer spatio-temporal scale to the interested
buyers, the so-called primary operators (POs), [2] and more
importantly, the POs should be able to lease their idle spectrum
to secondary operators (SOs), [3], who serve fewer users in
smaller areas. This method is expected to increase spectrum
utilization and already several related business models exist in
the market, [4]. However, the market-based solution is not a
panacea and should be carefully applied.
These schemes will give rise to hierarchical spectrum mar-
kets where the spectrum will be allocated in two stages, i.e.
from a state agency to the POs, and from each PO to the
SOs. The objective of the agency, which we call hereafter
controller (CO), is to allocate the spectrum efficiently, i.e.
so as to maximize the aggregate social welfare from its use.
However, this objective cannot be achieved by these markets
because of the following two reasons: (i) the coordination
problem, and the (ii) objectives misalignment problem. The
Fig. 1. The system consists of one Controller which has at his disposal K
identical channels. There exist M primary operators which ask for spectrum.
Each PO j acquires Kcj channels and uses Kj0 of them to satisfy the needs
of his own users and resells Kji channels to each SO i in the underneath
secondary market. There are N SOs in the monopoly market under each PO
which provide feedback to the CO for their needs and the decisions of the
POs.
first problem emerges when the CO assigns the spectrum to
the POs without considering the needs of the SOs (secondary
demand). The second problem arises due to the inherently
selfish behavior of POs who resell their spectrum in order
to maximize their revenue. Clearly, this strategy contradicts
the goal of the controller.
In this paper we study the spectrum allocation in these
hierarchical markets and propose an incentive mechanism
that enhances their performance by addressing the above two
issues. The mechanism is deployed by the controller who
acts as regulator and incentivizes the POs to redistribute their
spectrum in a socially aware fashion. We consider a basic
setting depicted in Figure 1, where each PO is a monopolist
and has a certain clientele of SOs. Monopolies are expected to
arise very often in these markets because the POs obtain the
exclusive spectrum use rights for certain areas or because they
collude and act effectively as one single seller. First, we an-
alyze the performance of the unregulated hierarchical market,
i.e. when there is no incentive mechanism, and we show that it
2results in an undesirable equilibrium. The spectrum allocation
from the CO to the POs and from the POs to the SOs is
accomplished through auction-based mechanisms since there
is lack of information about the spectrum demand. Namely,
the CO uses an efficient auction such as the VCG auction,
[5], while the POs employ an optimal auction, [6], which
maximizes the expected revenue of the seller but induces
efficiency loss, [7], [8].
Accordingly, we propose a pricing based incentive mech-
anism where the CO charges each PO in proportion to the
inefficiency that is caused by his spectrum redistribution deci-
sions. This way, the POs are induced to allocate their spectrum
using a new auction scheme which produces less revenue for
them but more welfare for the SOs. This is a novel multi-item
auction mechanism where the objective of the auctioneer is
a linear combination of his revenue and the valuations of the
bidders. The balance between the objective of the POs and
the SOs is tuned by a scalar parameter which is determined
by the CO and reflects his regulation policy. Finally, we apply
our mechanism to dynamic spectrum markets where the CO-
POs and the PO-SOs interactions are realized in different
time scale. Although in this case the coordination problem
is inherently unsolvable, the proposed scheme still improves
the performance of the market by aligning the decisions of the
POs with the objective of the CO.
B. Related Work and Contribution
Optimal auctions were introduced by Myerson, [6] for single
item allocation and extended later for multiple items, [9], or
divisible resource, [8]. They maximize the expected revenue
of the seller but are inefficient, [5], [7]. The interaction of
primary and secondary operators is usually modeled as a
monopoly market. For example, in [10] the authors consider
a setting where each primary license holder sells his idle
spectrum channels to a set of secondary users and show that
the optimal auction yields higher profit but results in inefficient
allocation. A similar monopolistic setting is considered in [11]
and [12]. In [13], a multiple-item optimal auction is used by
a primary service provider to allocate his channels to a set of
secondary service providers while satisfying at the same time
his own needs. It can be argued that even in oligopoly spectrum
markets is highly probable that the POs - SOs interaction will
result in spectrum allocation that is not efficient from the
perspective of the controller, [14]. All these works analyze
exclusively the primary - secondary operators interactions
without taking into account the hierarchical structure of the
spectrum markets.
This hierarchical aspect is studied in [15] where the authors
consider a multi-level spectrum market and present a mech-
anism to match the demand and the spectrum supply of the
interrelated spectrum markets in the different layers. Similar
models have been considered in [16] and [17] where the
buyers demand is considered known. Coordination problems
have been also studied for bandwidth allocation in wireline
networks, [18]. However, in these studies there is no misalign-
ment among the objectives of the various entities (operators,
users, etc) since they all maximize the revenue or the efficiency
of the allocation. On the contrary, in the setting we study the
entities have conflicting interests and the incentive mechanism
we present achieves their alignment. Our work is inspired
by the sponsored search (keyword) auction mechanisms, [19],
which assign the search engines advertising slots by taking
into account the feedback from the clickers. Similar concepts
can be used for the allocation of spectrum as we suggested
in [20]. Here, we take a further step towards this direction by
giving a detailed methodology.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are the fol-
lowing: (1) we analyze the hierarchical spectrum allocation
and show that it is inefficient, (2) we present an incentive
mechanism that motivates the POs to increase the efficiency of
their spectrum redistribution, (3) we introduce the β-optimal
auction which achieves a balance between the revenue of the
seller (optimality) and the welfare of the buyers (efficiency).
This is a new mechanism that can be used also for the
allocation of similar communication resources (bandwidth,
transmission power, etc), (4) we apply our mechanism to
dynamic markets where the CO-POs and the PO-SOs inter-
actions are realized in different time scales and we show
that it improves their efficiency. To our knowledge, this is
the first work that analytically studies the efficiency of the
hierarchical spectrum markets and introduces a mechanism for
their performance improvement.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we introduce the system model and in Section III we analyze
the hierarchical spectrum allocation without the intervention of
the controller. This analysis helps us to describe the incentive
mechanism and assess its efficacy in Section IV. Finally in
Section V we apply our mechanism to more dynamic spectrum
markets. We present our numerical study in section VI and
conclude in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a three-layer hierarchical spectrum market
with one controller (CO) on top of the hierarchy, a set
M = {1, 2, . . . ,M} of primary operators (POs) in the second
layer and a set N = {1, 2, . . . , N} of secondary operators
(SOs) that lie in the third layer under each PO, as it is
shown in Figure 1. There exists a set K = {1, 2, . . . ,K} of
identical spectrum channels managed initially by the CO. The
controller allocates the channels to the M primary operators
and accordingly each PO redistributes the channels he acquired
among himself and the N SOs that lie in his secondary market.
The objective of the POs is to incur maximum revenue from
reselling the spectrum while satisfying their own needs.
The perceived utility of each operator, PO or SO, for
acquiring a channel is represented by a scalar value. Following
the law of diminishing marginal returns, [14], we consider
that each additional channel has smaller value/benefit for
the operator. Different operators may have different spectrum
needs and hence different channel valuations. For example,
an operator with many clients will have very high channel
valuations. Also, the POs are expected to have in general
higher valuations than the SOs since they serve more users.
We summarize these different characteristics of the operators
3with a real-valued parameter which we call the type of the
operator, [5], [13]. Notice that, our system model is general
and satisfies the basic assumptions and requirements of many
different settings, [11], [15], [16], [18].
Secondary Operators: In detail, the perceived utility of the
ith SO for the kth channel is Uk(αi) ∈ R+ which is assumed
to be positive, monotonically increasing and differentiable
function of parameter αi. This is the type of the SO and
represents his spectrum needs. The types of the SOs in every
secondary market α = (αi : i ∈ N ) are mutually independent
random variables, αi ∈ A = (0, Amax), Amax ∈ R+, drawn
from the same distribution function F (·) with finite density
f(·) on A. We assume that it holds: U1(αi) ≥ U2(αi) ≥
. . . ≥ UK(αi) ≥ 0, for each αi ∈ A, i ∈ N . The SO i
pays for the assigned channels an amount of money that is
determined by the PO.
Primary Operators: Each jth PO receives Kcj channels
from the CO at a cost of Q(Kcj) monetary units and decides
how many he will reserve for his own needs, Kj0, and how
many he will allocate to each one of the N SOs at his
secondary market, Kj = (Kji : i ∈ N ). We assume that
the valuation of the jth PO for acquiring the kth channel
is Vk(pj) ∈ R+ which belongs to a known family of
functions Vk(·) and is parameterized by the private variable
p ∈ P = (0, Pmax), Pmax ∈ R+. In analogy with α,
p is the type of the PO and models his spectrum needs.
The valuation functions are considered positive, monotonically
increasing and continuously differentiable w.r.t. the type pj
and we assume that it is: V1(pj) ≥ . . . ≥ VK(pj) ≥ 0. The
benefit of the PO from reselling his spectrum is given by the
revenue component H(Kj) which depends on the number of
leased channels. We define the combined valuation - revenue
objective of each PO j ∈M as follows:
Vˆ (pj ,Kj0,Kj) =
Kj0∑
k=1
Vk(pj) +H(Kj) (1)
Controller: The goal of the controller is to increase the
spectrum utilization while ensuring the viability of the sec-
ondary markets. Therefore he acts as regulator and deploys
an incentive mechanism to induce a channel allocation that
maximizes a balanced sum of the POs’ combined objectives
and the valuations of the SOs:
C(β) =
M∑
j=1
[Vˆ (pj ,Kj0,Kj) + β
N∑
i=1
Kji∑
k=1
Uk(αi)] (2)
where β ∈ R+ is defined by the CO and determines this
balance. Apparently, as β increases, the allocation of spectrum
will favor the SOs. Notice that the objective of the CO
incorporates both the channel valuation of the POs and their
revenue components, since the latter are the their motivation
for reallocating the spectrum.
III. UNREGULATED HIERARCHICAL SPECTRUM
ALLOCATION
We begin our study with the unregulated hierarchical spec-
trum allocation. In this case, the CO does not take into account
the secondary demand when he allocates the channels to
the POs. The latter, may also be oblivious to the secondary
demand at the moment they ask for spectrum, or they can
make an early conjecture for the SOs needs or even they
can be aware of the exact secondary demand. For all these
scenarios, we show that the unregulated spectrum allocation
induces efficiency loss. The model and analysis of this section
is used in the sequel to introduce our mechanism and assess
its efficacy.
A. First Stage: POs - CO Interaction
In the first stage, the POs ask for spectrum and the controller
determines the channel distribution, Kc = (Kcj : j ∈M) and
the payment Q(Kcj). We assume that the CO knows the family
of the valuation functions of the POs, Vk(p), k ∈ K but not
their exact types, [5], [19]. Therefore the CO runs a Vickrey-
Clarke-Groove (VCG) auction, which is the most prominent
efficient auction [5], in order to elicit this information. Every
PO j ∈M submits a scalar bid, rj ∈ P , in order to declare his
type. The CO collects these bids, r = (rj : j ∈ M), and finds
the channel allocation that maximizes the total valuation of all
the POs by solving the CO Spectrum Allocation Problem,
(Pco):
max
Kc
M∑
j=1
Kcj∑
k=1
Vk(rj) (3)
s.t.
M∑
j=1
Kcj ≤ K, Kcj ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . ,K} (4)
One simple method to find the solution, K∗c , of problem Pco,
is to sort the valuations of the POs Vk(rj), j ∈M, k ∈ K, in
decreasing order and allocate the channels to the primary op-
erators with the K highest valuations. Apparently, the number
of channels the jth PO receives depends both on his own bid
rj and the bids of the other POs, r−j = (rm : m ∈M\{j}),
i.e. Kcj(rj , r−j).
The payment imposed to each PO, according to the VCG
payment rule [5], is equal to the externality he creates to the
other POs:
Q(rj , r−j) =
M∑
m 6=j
K˜∗cm∑
k=1
Vk(rm)−
M∑
m 6=j
K∗cm∑
k=1
Vk(rm) (5)
where K∗cm is the number of channels allocated to each PO
m ∈ M \ {j} according to the solution of problem (Pco)
and K˜∗cm the respective number when the jth PO does not
participate in the auction, i.e. rj = 0.
Let us assume now that the POs bid without knowing the
secondary demand. In this case, they consider only the benefit
from using the acquired channels for their own needs, Kj0 =
Kcj , and hence they determine their bid by solving the PO
Bidding Problem, (Pbpo) :
r∗j = argmax
rj
{
Kcj(rj,r−j)∑
k=1
Vk(pj)−Q(rj , r−j)} (6)
Since VCG auctions are incentive compatible, [5], the POs will
reveal their actual types, r∗j = pj , ∀j ∈ M. However, if POs
4are aware of the secondary demand (or can make a conjecture)
then they will bid so as to maximize their combined valuation
- revenue objective:
r∗j = argmax
rj
{Vˆ (pj ,Kj0,Kj)−Q(rj , r−j)} (7)
Apparently, if the CO still uses the payment rule given by eq.
(5) then the auction in this stage is not truthful anymore.
B. Second Stage: SOs - PO Interaction
In the second stage of the hierarchical spectrum allocation,
each j ∈ M PO finds the optimal allocation, (K∗j ,K∗j0), of his
Kcj channels that maximizes his combined objective, eq. (1).
This is given by the solution of the PO Spectrum Allocation
Problem, (Ppo):
max
Kj ,Kj0
Vˆ (pj ,Kj0,Kj) (8)
s.t.
Kj0 +
N∑
i=1
Kji ≤ Kcj, Kji, Kj0 ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . ,Kcj} (9)
We assume that after receiving his spectrum from the CO,
each PO obtains only partial information about the underneath
secondary market. Namely, he learns the family of the SOs
functions Uk(α), k ∈ K, and the types distribution function
F (·) but not the actual SOs types. To elicit this missing
information the PO runs an optimal auction where each one
of the N SOs submits a bid, bi ∈ A in order to declare his
type αi. The PO collects the bids, b = (bi : i ∈ N ), and
determines the allocated spectrum and the respective payment
for each bidder. Here, the seller (PO) is also interested in the
auctioned items and hence he compares his possible revenue
from selling a channel with the valuation for using it, Vk(·)
before he decides if he will allocate it to a SO or reserve it,
[6],[13].
The maximization of the expected revenue, (Ppo), can be
transformed to a deterministic channel allocation problem. Let
us first define the additional expected revenue the PO incurs
for assigning the kth channel to the ith SO. In auction theory,
[9], this is known as the contribution of the bidder and is
defined as:
pik(bi) = Uk(bi)−
dUk(α)
dα
α=bi
1− F (bi)
f(bi)
(10)
where F (·) and f(·) are the cdf and pdf of the SOs. If
these contributions are monotonically strictly increasing in the
SOs types and decreasing in the number of channels, then
they satisfy the so-called regularity conditions, [9], and the
auction problem Ppo is called regular. In this case the channel
allocation that maximizes the combined objective of the jth
PO can be easily derived using the following deterministic
allocation and payment rules.
1) PO Optimal Auction Allocation Rule: The auctioneer
(PO j) calculates the contributions pik(bi) of each SO i ∈ N
for all the auctioned channels, k = 1, . . . ,Kcj , and selects
the Kcj highest of them. In the sequel, he compares these
Kcj contributions with his own valuations for the channels
and constructs the contribution-valuation vector Xj which has
Kcj elements in decreasing order:
Xj = (x(l) : x(l) > x(l+1), l = 1, . . . ,Kcj) (11)
Then, the PO simply assigns each channel l = 1, . . . ,Kcj
to the respective ith SO if x(l) = pik(bi) or he reserves it
for himself if x(l) = Vk(pj). For example, for a PO with 4
channels and two SOs bidders, a possible instance of Xj is
Xj = (V1(pj), pi1(b1), pi1(b2), V2(pj)) which means that the
PO will reserve 2 channels for himself and assign one to each
SO.
2) PO Optimal Auction Payment Rule: The price that each
SO i pays for receiving the kth spectrum channel depends on
the bids submitted by all the other SOs, b−i = (bn : n ∈
N \ {i}). Namely, let us denote with zk(b−i) the minimum
bid that the ith SO has to submit in order to acquire the kth
channel, [9]:
zk(b−i) = inf{αˆi ∈ A : pik(αˆi) ≥ max{0, x(Kcj+1)}} (12)
This means that in order to get the kth item the ith SO has
simply to submit a bid high enough to draft his contribution
within the first Kcj elements of Xj . The actual charged price
for each channel is equal to his valuation had he a type equal
to this minimum bid. Hence the aggregate payment for the SO
is:
h(bi, b−i) =
Kji(bi,b−i)∑
k=1
Uk(zk(b−i)) (13)
This payment rule is an extension of the original rule
introduced in [6] and [9] and has been used also for the case
that the seller has valuation for the auctioned items in [13].
Hence, each SO i ∈ N bids according to the SO Bidding
Problem, (Pso):
b∗i = argmax
bi
{
Kji(bi,b−i)∑
k=1
Uk(αi)− h(b−i)} (14)
Due to the payment and the respective monotonic allocation
rule, the auction mechanism is incentive compatible and indi-
vidual rational, [10], [19], hence b∗i = αi, ∀i ∈ N .
C. Inefficiency of the Unregulated Hierarchical Scheme
The first reason that renders inefficient this hierarchical
allocation is the coordination problem: the CO allocates the
channels to the POs by solving Pco without considering the
demand of the SOs. In case the POs are also unaware of the
secondary demand the auction in the first stage is truthful and
efficient wrt the POs needs but not wrt to the POs - SOs
joint spectrum requirements. Namely, the CO may allocate
more channels to a PO who is going to encounter smaller
secondary demand than another PO. Now assume that the
POs receive the bids of the SOs or make an early conjecture
about the secondary demand before they ask CO for spectrum.
In this case, if the CO is still unaware of the SOs needs,
the hierarchical spectrum allocation is even more inefficient
since the POs will bid in order to maximize their combined
objective, according to eq. (7), and not their valuations, eq.
(6). This means that in the first auction, the seller (CO) and
5the bidders (POs) will use different valuation functions for
determining the prices and the bids respectively. Therefore, the
auction will not be incentive compatible anymore, i.e. rj 6= pj ,
j ∈M.
At the same time, and independently of the coordination
problem, there exists the objectives misalignment problem.
The CO and the POs have different goals and the revenue
maximizing auction that is organized by the latter incurs
efficiency loss, [5]. In the setting we study, this means that
a PO may reserve a channel for himself while there exist SOs
with higher valuation for it. Finally, notice that even if both
the CO and the POs are aware of the exact secondary demand,
still the problem of their objectives misalignment exists and
renders inefficient the hierarchical spectrum allocation.
IV. REGULATED HIERARCHICAL SPECTRUM ALLOCATION
In this section we build upon the previous analysis and
introduce our incentive mechanism. First, we explain the basic
idea of the mechanism and the difficulties that the controller
encounters in applying it. Next we introduce the β-optimal
auction which is required in order to enable the POs to balance
their revenue and the efficiency of their spectrum redistribu-
tion. Finally, we discuss the efficacy of the mechanism and its
requirements.
A. Incentive Mechanism MR
The goal of the controller is to induce the channel allocation
{K∗j0,K
∗
j} for each PO j ∈M and the respective secondary
market that maximizes his objective C(β), given by eq. (2).
This allocation stems from the solution of the CO Balanced
Spectrum Allocation Problem, (Pbalco ):
max
{Kj0,Kj}
M∑
j=1

Vˆ (pj ,Kj0,Kj) + β
N∑
i=1
Kji∑
k=1
Uk(αi)

 (15)
s.t.
M∑
j=1
[Kj0 +
N∑
i=1
Kji] ≤ Kc, Kj0,Kji ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . ,Kc}
(16)
parameter β ∈ R+ is determined by the CO and defines
implicitly the revenue of the POs and the welfare of the SOs.
The difficulties the controller encounters to achieve his goal,
are three: (i) the CO is not aware of the types of the POs,
pj , j ∈ M, (ii) he does not know the types of the SOs
in each secondary market, ai, i ∈ N , and (iii) he cannot
directly dictate the POs how to redistribute their channels.
In economic terms, conditions (i) and (ii) capture the hidden
information asymmetry, [14], of the spectrum market which
means that the controller is not aware of the actual needs of
the operators. Similarly, condition (iii) describes the hidden
action asymmetry, which exists in the market because the CO
is not aware of the actions of the POs. The introduced incentive
mechanism, which we call Mechanism MR, eliminates these
asymmetries and achieves the desirable spectrum allocation.
The proposed scheme is based on pricing and the underlying
idea is that the controller creates a coupling between the
spectrum allocation decisions of the POs and their cost for
acquiring the spectrum in order to bias their revenue maxi-
mizing strategy. Namely, we assume that the CO reimburses
the jth PO with the following price:
Lj(α,Kj , β) = β
N∑
i=1
Kji∑
k=1
Uk(αi) (17)
This modifies the PO’s objective function as follows:
VˆR(pj ,Kj0,Kj , β) = Vˆ (pj ,Kj0,Kj) + β
N∑
i=1
Kji∑
k=1
Uk(αi)
(18)
VˆR(·) is the regulated new combined objective of each PO
which depends on parameter β and is aligned with the bal-
anced objective of the CO, eq. (2).
B. The β-Optimal Auction Mechanism
Each PO maximizes VˆR(·) by solving a new allocation prob-
lem Pβpo which differs from the respective Ppo problem in the
objective function that is given now by eq. (18). Since the types
of the SOs are unknown, the primary operator runs again an
auction to elicit this hidden information. Nevertheless, this is
neither an efficient nor an optimal auction and hence he cannot
employ any of the known auction schemes. To address this
problem, we introduce a new multi-item auction mechanism,
the β-optimal auction, which ensures the maximization of
the balanced objective defined in eq. (18). This mechanism is
similar to the optimal auction discussed in section III-B with
the difference that the allocation rule is biased by parameter
β. This modification affects the channels allocation and results
in reduced revenue for the auctioneer but improved allocation
efficiency. The combination of optimal and efficient auctions
has been also suggested in [21] for single item allocation
where the authors proposed an efficient auction with a lower
bound on the seller’s revenue.
Let us now explain the rationale and machinery of the β-
optimal auction. First we define the β-contribution for each
SO i ∈ N under a certain PO j ∈M, as follows:
piβk (bi) = (1 + β)Uk(bi)−
dUk(α)
dα
α=bi
1− F (bi)
f(bi)
(19)
Since β ≥ 0 it will be piβk (αi) ≥ pik(αi) for all the SOs
and all the channels. Moreover, notice that if the initial
contributions satisfy the regularity conditions, [9], then the β-
contributions will also satisfy them and hence problem Pβpo
will be regular. Therefore, we can again derive deterministic
channel allocation and payment rules.
β-Optimal Auction Allocation Rule: Similarly to the
allocation rule of the optimal auction, the jth PO calculates
the piβk (bi) for all the SOs i ∈ N and all the channels
k = 1, . . . ,Kcj and compares them with his own valuations
in order to construct the contribution-valuation vector Xβj :
Xβj = (x
β
(l) : x
β
(l) > x
β
(l+1), l = 1, . . . ,K
β
cj) (20)
Using Xβj the PO allocates his channels to the respective Kcj
highest contributions and valuations. The resulting channel
6POs: pj
j=1,…,M
Controller
{ β }
SOs: αi
i=1,…,N
pay: QR(.), Lj(.)
bid: rj
Channels, 
Kcj + { Kji }, 
i=1,..,N 
bid: bi
pay: h
β
(.)
Channels, 
Kji
Feedback: 
{αi,  Kji}
Fig. 2. The machinery of incentive mechanism MR. The circulated infor-
mation, bids and channel allocation among the SOs, POs and the Controller
is depicted. The feedback can be provided from the SOs to the CO directly,
or be inferred using other means.
allocation (Kβj0,K
β
j ) solves problem Pβpo and maximizes
the new regulated objective VˆR(pj ,Kβj0,Kβj , β). Again, this
allocation rule is monotone increasing in the types of the SOs.
β-Optimal Auction Payment Rule: The payment rule
changes in order to comply with the new allocation rule.
Namely, the minimum bid that the ith SO needs to submit
in order to acquire the kth channel is:
zβk (b−i) = inf{αˆi ∈ A : pi
β
k (αˆi) ≥ max{0, x
β
(Kβ
cj
+1)
}} (21)
and, similarly to the previous mechanism, the total payment
for this SO is :
hβ(bi, b−i) =
K
β
ji
(bi,b−i)∑
k=1
Uk(z
β
k (b−i)) (22)
Under this new auction mechanism, each SO i ∈ N selects his
bid so as to maximize his payoff, (SO β-Bidding Problem,
P
β
so):
b∗i = argmax
bi
{
K
β
ji
(bi,b−i)∑
k=1
Uk(αi)− h
β(b−i)} (23)
This new auction mechanism improves the efficiency of the
POs - SOs interaction and at the same time preserves the
necessary properties of the classical optimal auctions.
Proposition 1. The β-optimal auction mechanism preserves
the incentive compatibility and the individual rationality prop-
erties of the optimal multi-unit auction introduced in [9].
The proof of this proposition can be found in our technical
report, [23].
C. Efficacy and Requirements of Mechanism MR
The pricing that is imposed by the CO, eq. (17), not only
bias the channel distribution strategy of the POs, but also
changes their bidding strategy. Namely, each PO j ∈ M after
receiving the bids of his SOs, determines his optimal bid by
solving the PO β-Bidding Problem, (Pbβpo):
r∗j = argmax{VˆR(pj ,K
β
j0,K
β
j )−QR(rj , r−j)} (24)
Algorithm 1 (Mechanism MR)
1st Stage: Channel Allocation by the CO (β is given).
(1.1:) Each SO i bids to the respective PO, according to
problem Pβso, eq. (23) and informs the CO about his needs
(feedback αi).
(1.2:) Each PO bids to the CO, by solving Pbβpo, eq. (24).
(1.3:) The CO solves problem Pbalco , eq. (15)-(16), and
allocates Kβcj = K
β
j0 +
∑N
i=1K
β
ji channels to each PO
j ∈M.
2nd Stage: Channel Redistribution by the POs.
(2.1:) Each PO j ∈M redistributes his channels according
to the β-Optimal Allocation Rule, Xβj .
(2.2:) Each SO i reveals to the CO the allocation decisions
of the respective PO (feedback Kβji).
(2.3:) The CO collects the feedback, calculates the price
Lj(·), eq. (17), and determines the overall payment for each
PO:
Λj = Y − β[
N∑
i=1
K
β
ji∑
k=1
Uk(αi)] +QR(rj , r−j)
Parameter Y ∈ R+ is a properly selected offset in order to
render the payments positive.
The CO determines the channel allocation by solving problem
P
bal
co , eq. (15) - (16), and calculates the new VCG prices as
follows:
QR =
M∑
m 6=j
VˆR(rm, K˜
β
m0, K˜
β
m)−
M∑
m 6=j
VˆR(rm,K
β
m0,K
β
m)
(25)
Again, the number of channels allocated to each PO m,
(Kβm0,K
β
m), depends on bids submitted by all the POs. Also,
(K˜βm0, K˜
β
m) is the channel allocation when rj = 0. Therefore,
the POs are induced to bid truthfully, r∗j = pj , j ∈ M. Ap-
parently, MR solves both the coordination and the misaligned
objectives problem. The improved efficiency of the channel
allocation under the β-optimal auction, can be also realized by
considering the inequality Uk(αi) ≥ piβk (bi) ≥ pik(bi) which
holds for all the POs and SOs. We summarize mechanismMR
in Algorithm 1 and Figure 2.
In order to calculate the prices Lj(·), the CO needs to
know the actual types of the SOs in the respective secondary
market and the amount of spectrum that is allocated to them
by the PO. There are many different methods and scenarios
about how the CO can acquire this information. First, the SOs
may directly provide it through a feedback loop, Figure 1, if
there is a trusted relationship among them. Equivalently, the
CO may be able to observe the interaction (bidding) of the
SOs with the respective PO. Recall that the SOs bid truthfully
due to the incentive compatibility property of the β-optimal
auction. Finally, the POs may also reveal the outcome of their
interactions with the SOs.
Since the controller is on top of this hierarchy and manages
the spectrum, we can easily consider many similar methods
that will allow him to receive direct or indirect feedback
about the SOs - POs interaction. However, in all these cases,
7the basic assumption of our mechanism is that the SOs do
not anticipate the impact of their bids to the CO decisions
(price takers). That is, their bidding strategy is not affected by
the monitoring/observation by the controller, which is rather
expected due to the large number of the SOs, i.e. N × M .
Finally, we assume that the SOs bid to the POs before the latter
ask for spectrum. If we relax this assumption, the coordination
problem is by default unsolvable, but our mechanism still
improves the hierarchical spectrum allocation by addressing
the objectives misalignment problem. This issue is discussed
in the next section, in the context of the dynamic spectrum
markets, where it is more prevalent.
V. REGULATION IN DYNAMIC SPECTRUM MARKETS
Until now, we ignored the dynamic aspect of the problem
in order to facilitate the analysis and we focused on the novel
balanced auction scheme. That is, we implicitly assumed that
the interaction of the CO with the POs, and the interactions
of the latter with the SOs are performed in the same time
scale. This is a realistic assumption since the current sugges-
tions about the spectrum policy reform advocate a more fine
grained spatio-temporal management by the regulators, [2].
Nevertheless, the proposed mechanism MR can be extended
for the case where the CO-POs and POs-SOs interactions are
realized in different time scales. Due to lack of space we will
briefly explain how the mechanism is adapted for this setting.
Assume that the time is slotted and divided in time periods,
I = 1, 2, . . ., where each period is further divided in T time
slots, t = 1, 2, . . . , T . The CO determines his Kc channels
allocation in the beginning of each period while the POs
redistribute them in every slot. The CO Pbalco problem for this
setting is related to the spectrum allocation for all the T slots
within each period:
max
{Kt
j0
,Kt
j
}
T∑
t=1
M∑
j=1

Vˆ (pj ,Ktj0,Ktj) + β
N∑
i=1
Ktji∑
k=1
Uk(α
t
i)


(26)
s.t.
M∑
j=1
[Ktj0 +
N∑
i=1
Ktji] ≤ Kc, t = 1, . . . , T (27)
where we have marked with the superscript t the variables
that change in each slot. Obviously the CO cannot allocate
the spectrum optimally to the POs for the entire period since
he is not aware of the future demands of the SOs. Additionally,
even if the CO had this information, he could not determine the
allocated channels to the POs, Kcj , once in each period since
these should be adapted to the dynamic secondary demand,
Ktji. Apparently, the coordination problem cannot be solved
optimally in this setting.
Nevertheless, the CO is still able to solve the objectives
misalignment problem and induce the POs to allocate their
spectrum more efficiently. Assume that the CO-POs interaction
is accomplished either without taking into account the sec-
ondary demand as in Section III or by considering the average
demand of the SOs, α¯i. This will result in a certain suboptimal
channel allocation K¯c = {K¯cj : j ∈ M}. Then, in each slot
as the SOs demand will be realized, they will bid to the POs
and at the same time the CO will receive feedback (directly
or indirectly) about their needs. This way, the controller will
be able to determine the prices Lj(·) for each PO j ∈ M at
the end of the entire time period:
LTj (α, {K
t
j}, β) =
T∑
t=1
β
N∑
i=1
Ktji∑
k=1
Uk(α
t
i) (28)
Obviously, this subsequent pricing at the end of each time
period will induce the POs to allocate their spectrum by
solving problem Pβpo and maximizing eq. (18), instead of
problem Ppo, eq. (8)-(9), in each time slot. Therefore, the
efficiency loss will be reduced.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In order to obtain insights about the proposed mechanism
MR, we simulate a representative three-layer hierarchical
market with one CO, M = 2 POs and N = 10 SOs under each
PO. We assume that the POs valuation functions for the kth
channel are Vk(pj) = pj/k, where the types pj are uniformly
distributed in the interval [5, 6]. Similarly, the SOs valuations
are Uk(αi) = 0.1αi/k, and their types follow a uniform
distribution F (x) = x/4 on the interval (0, 4]. The SOs
contributions are pik(αi) = (0.2αi−0.4)/k and the respective
β-contributions are piβk (αi) = [(0.2+ β)αi − 0.4]/k. For each
random realization of the SOs and POs types, the results are
averaged over 40 runs in order to capture the variance on the
spectrum demand.
For our study we use as a benchmark the efficient channel
allocation to the SOs. This allocation corresponds to the hypo-
thetical scenario where the CO would be able to assign directly
the channels to both the POs and the SOs and maximize the
aggregate spectrum valuations. In the upper plot of Figure 3
we show that in hierarchical unregulated market the number of
total channels assigned to the SOs is less than the channels in
the efficient allocation. Mechanism MR with β = 0.1 reduces
this difference and increases the SOs channels. Notice that
the number of SOs channels is stil less than in the efficient
allocation scenario, since the goal of the CO is the combined
revenue-efficiency balanced allocation.
In the same Figure we show that the number of channels
assigned to SOs vary with the value of β. Namely, when β = 0
the MR regulated allocation is identical with the unregulated
allocation while for β ≈ 0.35 it reaches the efficient allocation.
Notice that for larger values of β > 0.37 the SOs receive
even more channels. This means that the CO favors the SOs
too much and render the channel allocation inefficient. The
impact of β is depicted also in the lower plot of Figure, 4
where we see that for large values the improvement in the
aggregate valuation of the POs and SOs becomes negative.
For this plot, the number of SOs is N = 20 and the system
welfare is maximized for β = 0.1. If β is further increased,
the welfare improvement decreases and eventually becomes
negative. Finally, we refer the interested readers to [23] for an
additional, analytical example of applying MR.
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Fig. 3. Upper Plot: For β = 0.1 the regulation mechanism MR increases
the number of channels assigned to the SOs. Lower Plot: The SOs receive
more channels for larger values of β (Kc = 80).
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Fig. 4. Upper Plot: The aggregate network efficiency (POs and SOs
valuations) increases with the MR, β = 0.1, N = 20, Kc = 1 : 60.
Lower Plot: For large values of β the network efficiency decreases since the
SOs are favored more than the POs.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we proposed an incentive mechanism that can
be used by the controller in order to regulate the interaction
between the primary and secondary operators in hierarchical
spectrum markets and to induce a new market equilibrium.
This equilibrium depends on a scalar parameter which is
defined by the controller and determines the efficiency of the
secondary markets by adjusting the number of channels allo-
cated to the SOs. The mechanism is based on a novel auction
scheme which has a revenue-welfare balanced objective. There
exist several directions for future work. First, it is interesting
to relax the assumption of monopoly markets and study the
impact of POs competition on the network performance. We
would like to compare the results of competition and regulation
in these hierarchical markets. Another intriguing direction is
to consider the more realistic setting where there is no prior
knowledge about the SOs types or the family of POs and
SOs valuation functions, and apply learning schemes to elicit
this hidden information in the spirit of [22]. Finally, even
more challenging is to consider the scenario where the SOs
anticipate the impact of their bidding to the mechanism and
strategize against it in order to gain higher benefits.
APPENDIX
Numerical Example
Consider a market where the CO has 12 channels, there
are 2 POs and 2 SOs under each PO. The SOs types are
drawn from a uniform cdf F (x) = x/2 in the interval (0, 2]
and their valuation for the kth channel is Uk(α) = αk . The
respective valuations of the POs are Vk(p) = 3∗pk . We assume
that p1 = 1 with α1 = 1.2 and α2 = 1.5 and p2 = 1.2
with α3 = 1.3 and α4 = 1.4. The contributions of the SOs
are pik(α) =
2α−2
k
. If the channel allocation is accomplished
with the unregulated hierarchical method then in the first
stage the CO allocates the channels to the highest valuations
of the POs and these redistribute them comparing their own
valuations with the contributions of the SOs in their market.
This results in Chpo = 10 channels allocated to the POs
and Chso = 2 assigned channels to the SOs. If however,
the POs were socially aware and considered the valuations
of the SOs (instead of their contributions) then the channel
allocation would be [Chpo, Chso] = [8, 4]. Finally, even this
allocation is not the most efficient because in the first stage
the secondary demand has not be considered. If for example
the CO was able to allocate directly the channels w.r.t. the
POs and SOs valuations, then the allocation would result
in [Chpo, Chso] = [7, 5]. Now, assume that we use the the
proposed mechanism MR, with β = 0.2. In this case, the
number of assigned channels will be Chpo = 9 and Chso = 3,
i.e. increased by 1 for the SOs. Apparently for large values
of β the allocation will favor the SOs and the revenue of the
POs will decrease.
Proof of Proposition 1
We focus on PO j ∈M with Kcj channels. We denote sik
the probability of SO i for receiving the kth channel which
depends on the types of all the SOs. Additionally, ci(αi) is
the payment of each SO i for all the channels he acquired.
Definition 2 and Lemma 1 in [9] give the necessary conditions
for the structure of the bidders (SOs) valuation functions in
order to ensure the (IC) and (IR) properties. These conditions
hold independently of the objective of the auctioneer (PO) and
hence they are not affected by the incorporation of the linear
term of the SOs valuation.
The objective of the PO w.r.t. the expected types of the SOs
is:
EA[VˆR(·)] =
N∑
i=1
EA[ci(αi)] + β
N∑
i=1
EA[
Kcj∑
k=1
Uk(αi)sik]+
+ EA[
Kcj∑
k=1
Vk(pj)(1 −
N∑
i=1
sik)]
9The first term is the payment by the SOs, the second is the
pricing and the third the valuation for the non-sold channels.
After some algebraic manipulations similarly to proof of
Proposition 1 in [9], we get:
EA[VˆR(·)] =
N∑
i=1
EA{
Kcj∑
k=1
[(1 + β)Uk(αi)− Vk(pj)−
dUk(αi)
dα
1− F (αi)
f(αi)
]sik} −
N∑
i=1
[
Kcj∑
k=1
Uk(0)− ci(0)] + EA[
Kcj∑
k=1
Vk(pj)]
Using the necessary (IC) and (IR) conditions from Lemma 1
in [9], it stems that the β-optimal payment rule is given again
by equation (10) of [9]:
c∗i (αi) = EA{
Kcj∑
k=1
Uk(αi)sik −
∫ αi
0
dUk(α)
dα
sikdα} (29)
where the probabilities of allocation are selected so as to
maximize the new objective of the auctioneer (instead of
revenue only maximization as in [9]). The optimal payment
rule is the one that yields zero payment and zero channel
allocation for SOs with zero type.
If the problem is regular then the payment is as we
described in section IV and the first term in the PO’s objective
is maximized by using the β-optimal allocation rule. This
can be easily derived following the proof of the respective
Proposition 2 in [9]. Notice that if the original respective
problem in [9] is regular then also this modified problem is
regular. Apparently, the inclusion of the SOs buyers valuations
does not affect the monotonicity of the allocation rule nor the
critical value property of the payment rule, [19]. Hence, the
modified auction is still truthful.
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